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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 12-2504 
______ 
 
     MARY E. KASPER 
   Appellant 
       
v. 
 
COUNTY OF BUCKS; LAURA LOBIANCO;  
MICHAEL CIANFICHI; BUCKS COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
______ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (District Court No. 2-11-cv-03544) 
District Court Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 14, 2013 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges, and STARK, District Judge*
 
 
(Filed: February 15, 2013) 
 
 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                                          
* The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, District Judge for the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware, sitting by designation. 
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 The appellant, Mary Kasper, appeals from the judgment of the District Court 
dismissing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) her various claims concerning alleged 
harassment and discrimination at work and declining to afford her the opportunity to file 
a second amended complaint.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I 
We write principally for the benefit of the parties and recite only the facts essential 
to our disposition.1
                                                          
1 When considering an appeal from a dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 
we accept as true all well pled factual allegations. Santiago v. GMAC Mortg. Group, Inc., 
417 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 Kasper was employed as a supervisor in the Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania, Domestic Relations Division (Division) from February, 2008, until she 
announced her resignation in April, 2011. Kasper, who is white, has an adopted son who 
is black. In September, 2009, Kasper’s coworker, defendant Michael Cianfichi, entered 
Kasper’s office without permission, removed a photograph of her adopted son, scanned a 
copy of the photograph into a document the Division maintained listing the “top ten” 
most delinquent child support defendants, and showed this document to Kasper and 
another coworker. The following day, Kasper complained about the incident orally to a 
superior, defendant Laura LoBianco, and submitted a written complaint shortly 
thereafter. In the written letter, Kasper described her surprise and dismay at the incident. 
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Kasper also alluded to her previous conversation with LoBianco, in which LoBianco 
seemingly had suggested that Kasper speak directly with Cianfichi: 
I took your advice and spoke with [Cianfichi] directly today regarding what 
occurred. I explained to him how his joke made me feel and he apologized. I 
informed him that my role as a parent is to defend my child, and I wanted to tell this 
to him directly as opposed to him hearing this only from you. I let him know that 
there are no hard feelings and that I’d like to continue the positive working 
relationship we have maintained thus far. 
 
LoBianco took no action to discipline Cianfichi for the incident or to prevent 
future incidents. Following Kasper’s complaint to LoBianco, Cianfichi and others began 
“an open and nonstop campaign of harassment and intimidation against [Kasper] in an 
effort to harm her and drive her from her job” through, inter alia, unmerited criticism of 
Kasper’s work product and use of sick days. LoBianco was aware of this behavior and 
did not intervene to stop it. 
Approximately one year after the incident with Cianfichi, LoBianco issued a 
disciplinary notice to Kasper regarding Kasper’s improper use of sick days—specifically, 
her use of sick time to take her adopted son to doctor’s appointments prior to her being 
eligible to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 
2601 et seq., in connection with the son. The notice required that Kasper bring doctor’s 
notes for further non-FMLA sick leave and warned that further violations could result in 
further discipline. Kasper was placed on “Step I” disciplinary status as a result of her 
violations of attendance policy.2
                                                          
2 “Step I” is the second tier of a five-level disciplinary scale: 1) Warning; 2) Step I; 3) 
Step II; 4) Step III/Final Warning/Suspension; 5) Termination. 
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A second disciplinary notice issued the same day placed Kasper on “Warning” 
status due to her unsatisfactory performance as a supervisor at the Division. The warning 
cited Kasper’s lack of communication with co-managers and failure to take direction 
from these co-managers as well as poor performance on several specific projects or tasks. 
The warning also called on Kasper to make a “complete turn around” if she wished to 
remain at the Division. 
In April, 2011, Kasper announced her resignation from the Division. 
In June, 2011, Kasper brought the present action in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Kasper raised three claims: an equal protection claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against LoBianco alleging deliberate indifference to 
discrimination against Kasper and complicity in an ongoing pattern of racially based 
harassment; a claim under the FMLA against LoBianco and the County of Bucks, 
alleging retaliation for Kasper’s use of FMLA leave; and a state-law tort claim against 
Cianfichi alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
In response to the complaint, defendants LoBianco and Cianfichi moved to 
dismiss all counts pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). They asserted that Kasper had 
failed to state a § 1983 claim because she neither articulated a “class of one” theory nor 
claimed deprivation of a constitutional right; that Kasper had failed to state an FMLA 
claim because she failed to allege an adverse employment action; and that Kasper had 
failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because she failed to 
allege extreme and outrageous conduct by Cianfichi.  
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Defendant County of Bucks filed a separate motion to dismiss asserting that 
Kasper, LoBianco, and Cianfichi were not employees of the County and that, in the 
alternative, Kasper had failed to make out a claim under the FMLA.  
Kasper then filed an amended complaint. The District Court dismissed the above 
motions as moot and ordered the defendants to respond to the amended complaint. 
Kasper’s amended complaint added the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas as a 
defendant, alleging that the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, along with the 
County of Bucks, were joint employers of Kasper. The amended complaint did not bring 
any claims or request any relief specifically concerning the Bucks County Court of 
Common Pleas. The amended complaint also added a number of factual allegations 
concerning County of Bucks’ status as an employer of the other parties, but Kasper did 
not amend the substantive allegations in the complaint. LoBianco, Cianfichi, and the 
County of Bucks then renewed their motions to dismiss. The Bucks County Court of 
Common Pleas likewise moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Kasper had 
failed to state a claim against the court, that the court was immune from suit under the 
11th Amendment, and that the court was not a “person” for purposes of § 1983. 
The District Court, on April 27, 2012, dismissed each of Kasper’s claims with 
prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that Kasper’s § 1983 claim failed 
because she did not allege that she was treated differently from similarly situated people 
with respect to the alleged “campaign of harassment” and because she had failed to allege 
that LoBianco’s acquiescence led to Cianfichi’s initial discriminatory action. In 
dismissing this claim, the District Court declined to extend Kasper an opportunity to 
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submit a second amended complaint on the ground that Kasper had previously been 
placed on notice of these deficiencies and had failed to cure them. The Court dismissed 
Kasper’s FMLA claim against LoBianco and the County on the ground that the Step 1 
disciplinary warning imposed in relation to Kasper’s use of sick days was not a 
sufficiently severe sanction to qualify as an adverse employment decision. Finally, the 
Court concluded with respect to Kasper’s intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim that Cianfichi’s alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous and extreme to 
give rise to a cause of action under Pennsylvania law. This timely appeal followed. 
II 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of each of Kasper’s 
claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). McMullen v. Maple Shade Twp., 643 F.3d 
96, 98 (3d Cir. 2011). Dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of Kasper’s factual 
allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to her, Kasper 
is nonetheless not entitled to relief under any plausible reading of the complaint. Id.  
 We turn first to the District Court’s dismissal of Kasper’s § 1983 claim. Kasper 
has alleged that LoBianco was deliberately indifferent to Cianfichi’s discrimination, that 
she consciously failed to protect Kasper from Cianfichi’s conduct, and that she 
knowingly engaged in and encouraged an ongoing pattern of racially based harassment. 
In order to establish a § 1983 equal protection claim on this basis, Kasper must 
demonstrate that she received different treatment than other similarly situated persons 
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and that the disparate treatment was based on her protected class status.3
                                                          
3 Although generally an equal protection claim may be made out even absent membership 
in a protected group based on disparate treatment of a “class of one”; Vill. of 
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1075, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 
(2000); the Supreme Court has qualified that “the class-of-one theory of equal protection 
has no application in the public employment context.” Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 
553 U.S. 591, 607, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2156, 170 L. Ed. 2d 975 (2008). Kasper claims that 
her status as the adoptive mother of a black child affords her protected class status. 
Although there is support for the proposition that association with her black adopted son 
provides a basis for asserting protected class status; see, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 
F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (interracial marriage); RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 
307 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2002) (association with black club patrons); we need not 
resolve this issue: even assuming, arguendo, that Kasper can properly claim protected 
class status, her claim fails on other grounds, as discussed below. 
 See Andrews v. 
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990). The great bulk of Kasper’s § 
1983 assertions are plainly defective in that they fail to allege disparate treatment relative 
to other similarly situated people and are not pled with adequate specificity. Kasper’s 
amended complaint simply gives no indication that the various criticisms of her 
performance as alleged in the complaint were brought against Kasper in a manner distinct 
from others similarly situated. Moreover, the complaint contains no specific allegations 
concerning the particulars of the alleged “campaign” of harassment or of LoBianco’s 
knowledge of the alleged harassing events, nor does it offer anything beyond a 
conclusory assertion linking these criticisms to racial discrimination based on Kasper’s 
adoption of a black child. These claims thus fail for want of adequate pleading. See 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) (“A court considering a motion to dismiss 
may begin by identifying allegations that, because they are mere conclusions, are not 
entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s 
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framework, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). See also Argueta v. U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 74 (3d Cir. 2011) (“broad allegations 
regarding the existence of a ‘culture of lawlessness’ are accorded little if any weight in 
our analysis.”).  
Kasper’s complaint describes a single incident with adequate factual specificity: 
Cianfichi’s misuse of the photograph of Kasper’s adopted black son and LoBianco’s 
subsequent failure to discipline Cianfichi.4
As the District Court properly concluded, Kasper’s acquiescence claim necessarily 
fails because she has not alleged any action or acquiescence on LoBianco’s part prior to 
Cianfichi’s prank. There is thus nothing in the complaint supporting a conclusion that 
LoBianco engaged in “acquiescence leading to discrimination.” Id. (emphasis added). 
See also Argueta, 643 F.3d at 74 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Broadly speaking . . . the typical 
 Because Kasper has brought this claim against 
LoBianco but has not specifically alleged any acts of direct discrimination by LoBianco 
herself in this connection, Kasper must further demonstrate that LoBianco’s affirmative 
conduct, by order or acquiescence, led to discrimination by Cianfichi, her subordinate. 
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1478 (“The existence of an order or acquiescence leading to 
discrimination must be pled and proven with appropriate specificity.”).  
                                                          
4 Although Kasper does not directly assert that she was treated differently from others 
similarly situated in this respect, she does specifically describe the alleged racial 
motivations behind Cianfichi’s action, and given the nature of the prank it is fair to infer 
from the complaint that similarly situated coworkers were not subject to the same sort of 
action by Cianfichi. See Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 
1985) (on 12(b)(6) motion plaintiff entitled to benefit of all reasonable inferences that can 
be fairly be drawn from complaint).  
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‘notice’ case seems to involve a prior incident or incidents of misconduct by a specific 
employee or group of employees, specific notice of such misconduct to their superiors, 
and then continued instances of misconduct by the same employee or employees.”).  
III 
In dismissing Kasper’s § 1983 claim, the District Court declined to offer her the 
opportunity to file a second amended complaint. Although affording a plaintiff leave to 
amend is ordinarily a discretionary matter for the District Court subject to review for 
abuse of that discretion; Krantz v. Prudential Investments Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 
140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002); we have held that “in civil rights cases district courts must offer 
amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for failure 
to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. 
Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). See also Darr v. 
Wolfe, 767 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Alston v. Parker, 
363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (“this court has consistently held that when an 
individual has filed a complaint under § 1983 which is dismissable for lack of factual 
specificity, he should be given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect, if he can, by 
amendment of the complaint and that denial of an application for leave to amend under 
these circumstances is an abuse of discretion.”).  
In the present case, Kasper was placed on notice of the defects in her pleadings 
when the defendants moved to dismiss her initial complaint. She then filed an amended 
complaint that made no effort to cure these deficiencies. Kasper has thus already been 
afforded the opportunity to amend that we require in civil rights cases. The District Court 
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in weighing the equities of this case therefore did not abuse its discretion by declining to 
sua sponte offer Kasper an additional opportunity to amend her complaint.  
IV 
We turn next to the District Court’s dismissal of Kasper’s FMLA claim. Pursuant 
to 29 U.S.C. § 2617, an employee may bring a private cause of action against an 
employer alleging a violation of the FMLA. In order to establish a claim of 
discrimination under the FMLA, a plaintiff must show that, having exercised rights 
protected under the FMLA, “he suffered an adverse employment decision, and . . . the 
adverse decision was causally related to his leave.” Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas 
Co., 364 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir. 2004); see Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 
509 (3d Cir. 2009). To demonstrate the existence of an adverse employment decision, the 
Supreme Court has held, in the Title VII context, that “a plaintiff must show that a 
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,” such 
that the action well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from taking a protected 
action. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Burlington Northern standard applies in the FMLA 
context5
                                                          
5 Prior to Burlington Northern, this Court’s jurisprudence employed a somewhat more 
restrictive definition of “adverse employment action” which required an action that 
“alters the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
deprives him or her of employment opportunities, or adversely affects his or her status as 
an employee.” Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Kasper’s claim cannot succeed under even 
 and accepting Kasper’s conclusory gestures indicating that she took FMLA 
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leave and that her “Step 1” disciplinary warning was the result of taking this leave,6 the 
District Court properly determined that the disciplinary measure was not of such severity 
that it might dissuade a reasonable worker from taking FMLA leave. The Step 1 action 
did no more than require Kasper to provide doctor’s notes in relation to future non-
FMLA absences. This requirement was far from onerous and as such is best classified 
among the “minor annoyances” of office life that do not rise to the level of adverse 
employment actions. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68. Although the 
Step 1 action raised the prospect of future discipline, the District Court properly 
determined that it was not itself a materially adverse sanction.7
V 
  
 We consider, finally, the District Court’s dismissal of Kasper’s state law claim 
against Cianfichi for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Pennsylvania, 
“[l]iability on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim ‘has been found only 
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Supreme Court’s somewhat broader definition of “adverse employment action,” we 
need not conclusively determine whether this definition necessarily applies to FMLA as 
well as Title VII cases. 
6 There is nothing in the complaint to indicate that the second warning regarding Kasper’s 
work performance had any relationship to her FMLA leave. 
7 Kasper objects to the fact that the District Court, in reaching this conclusion, referred to 
the fact that the disciplinary notice did not alter the compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of her employment. She asserts that this reference is in tension with the 
Burlington Northern analysis, which does not use this language. See footnote 5 of this 
opinion. It is clear from the District Court’s opinion, however, that the Court applied the 
Burlington Northern analysis and referred to the fact that there was no change in the 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment only to reinforce its 
determination that Kasper had not suffered a materially adverse employment action under 
the Burlington Northern standard. 
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beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community.’” Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 231-32 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Field v. Phila. Elec. Co., 388 Pa. Super. 400, 565 A.2d 1170, 1184 
(1989)). As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further elaborated: 
Cases which have found a sufficient basis for a cause of action of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress have had presented only the most egregious conduct. 
See e.g., Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118 (1970)(defendant, after 
striking and killing plaintiff’s son with automobile, and after failing to notify 
authorities or seek medical assistance, buried body in a field where discovered two 
months later and returned to parents (recognizing but not adopting section 46)); 
Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital, 293 Pa.Super. 122, 437 A.2d 1236 
(1981)(defendants intentionally fabricated records to suggest that plaintiff had 
killed a third party which led to plaintiff being indicted for homicide); Chuy v. 
Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d. Cir. 1979)(defendant’s team 
physician released to press information that plaintiff was suffering from fatal 
disease, when physician knew such information was false). 
 
Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134, 151-52, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (1998). 
 In the present case, Kasper has made vague assertions of an ongoing campaign of 
harassment by Cianfichi and others, but the only incident she has alleged with any factual 
specificity is Cianfichi’s prank involving Kasper’s adopted son. Kasper has pointed to no 
case in which a court has found a similar prank to rise to the level of being considered 
“utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” and the behavior she complains of comes 
nowhere near the level of conduct that Pennsylvania courts have recognized as so 
qualifying. Moreover, Kasper’s own letter written to LoBianco following the event 
indicates that Cianfichi apologized for the incident and that Kasper described an 
otherwise functioning working relationship between the two of them. The District Court 
therefore properly dismissed Kasper’s claim on this count.  
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The decision of the District Court will be affirmed.8
 
 
                                                          
8 The District Court did not reach the defendants’ additional grounds for dismissal, 
including the County of Bucks’ claim that it was not in fact Kasper’s employer for 
FMLA purposes and the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas’ claims that it is not 
covered by § 1983 and that it is immune with respect to Kasper’s § 1983 and FMLA 
claims. Because we hold that the District Court properly dismissed Kasper’s amended 
complaint on the above grounds, we likewise will not address these additional claims. 
